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The basic concepts of the law as they pertain 
to urology ,are no different from any other part of the 
law which pertains to the medical profession. I shall 
not spend a lot of time going over that, except to say 
that you owe the same duty that any other physician 
owes to a patient, and that is to exercise that degree 
of oare which the average urologist would exercise 
under the same or similar circumstances. The courts 
generally say further, "in the same or similar com-
munities," and then qualify it still further by saying, 
"regard being had for the state of medical science 
at the time." It narrows down to the fact that you 
do not have to be the best, but you cannot be the 
worst. If you conform to this standard, you have a 
reasonably good chance of staying out of trouble 
as far as the law is concerned. 
Now let's go into two or three 1areas which have 
arisen recently and which should give all of the 
medical profession some concern. I am sure you 
have heard the term "informed consent." Basically, 
the term "consent" itself implies that if you do a 
procedure upon a patient without the patient's per-
mission, you have committed a battery on that pa-
tient, and the patient is entitled to recover for any 
damages done. No expert testimony is required, and 
you can be liable for punitive damages which your 
malpractice insurance carrier will not pay. This is 
a very narrow field because very seldom do physi-
cians today do procedures without some type of 
permission or consent. 
But the area of "informed" consent is a much 
more complex proposition, and the problems are 
steadily increasing, both medically and legally. The 
underlying concept to this whole proposition is 
fundamental to American jurisprudence; that is, that 
every human being of adult years and of sound mind 
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has a right to determine what shall be done to his 
own body. There are numerous ex,amples of this. 
One of the classic examples is that of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses who, because of their convictions, will not 
accept blood transfusions. The courts, all the way to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, have uni-
formly held that a person has such a right of refusal 
even if it means his death, and you have no right to 
intervene. When you get down to the basic premise 
that each individual should be allowed to determine 
what happens to him, no one can question the 
validity of the principle. It's good and it's sound. 
There are ramifications, though, when the patient 
has given consent but where a complication or risk 
develops. If the patient has not been told about the 
risk, he may bring a suit contending that he was not 
adequately informed and had he been, he would not 
have consented. This is not a battery, although in 
some places this has been attempted in order to get 
punitive damages. The courts uniformly recognize 
that this is no more than a breach of duty, the duty 
that you have to treat your patient properly. There 
is a duty to inform the patient of what you are going 
to attempt to do and the possible complications and 
risks, and a failure to do so amounts only to a breach 
of that duty. It is treated in the same category as any 
other negligence action. 
From this, then, let us consider the two basic 
principles which must be kept in mind. First of all, 
the patient has a right of self-determination, and this 
imposes upon you the duty to make a disclosure to 
him. Second, the amount of the disclosure is to be 
measured in terms of "reasonable." Basically, that 
is what the courts have said, and that is what the 
duty is based upon. These principles are generally 
recognized, although I must say they are not recog-
nized in all places, and have been treated rather 
oasually in some places. The majority rule among the 
states today is that in determining how much is to 
be disclosed to a patient, the same rule is followed 
249 
250 
as determines the standard of care in treating the 
patient, namely, what the standard is within the 
medical community. This is generally followed and 
has been a reasonably good defense up until now. I 
might say, for those of you who are from Virginia, 
the question has not arisen here, and I do not 
anticipate ariy great problems. 
There are two recent cases, however, which 
throw a shadow over the whole question of consent 
and disclosure. They do not set forth any specific 
rules to be followed, but they do establish that the 
duty goes much further than anyone had ever con-
templated. The first was a case from the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia handed down in 
May 1972. To summarize briefly, a nineteen-year-
old male had only a back pain. He was seen by a 
series of physicians and finally by a neurosurgeon 
who recommended that he have a laminectomy. He 
was not told that about 1 % of the laminectomies end 
up with some sort of paralysis. He agreed to the 
operation, and unfortunately, after a chain of vary-
ing events, he became paralyzed. The District Court 
which heard the case ruled, as a matter of law, in 
favor of the physicians, both on the question of 
malpractice and negligence in the way the operation 
was performed and also on the failure to inform 
the patient of all the risks involved. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the case on all issues and sent it 
back for trial on the merits. Some of the statements 
made by the court are general statements which 
apply across the board: 
Due care demands that the physician warn 
the patient of any risks to his well-being 
by the contemplated therapy. The patient 
must have some understanding and famili-
arity with the therapeutic alternatives and 
their hazards. The physician must disclose 
the choices and the dangers inherently and 
potentially involved. 
Those are rather broad, sweeping admonitions. 
The court said that the standard is "what is reason~ 
able under the circumstances and that this is not 
to be determined solely by the physician." The court 
went on to say that this is a matter in which laymen 
have knowledge and are in a position to express an 
opinion or view. It is not in the same category as the 
type of treatment that should be rendered for a 
particular condition. All of the risks which poten-
tially affect the decision to be made by the patient 
must be revealed. The court defines this by saying, 
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"A risk is thus material when a reasonable person, 
in what the physician knows or should know to be 
the patient's position, would be likely to attach sig-
nificance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding 
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy." 
That is a way of saying that you must put yourself 
in the patient's position, so to speak, in prospect and 
not in retrospect. If a reasonable person, knowing 
what the risk is, might forego the procedure, you 
must tell him what the risk is. The court has gone 
further and said, "A very small chance of death 
or serious disability may well be significant; a poten-
tial disability which dramatically outweighs the po-
tential benefit of the therapy or the detriments of the 
existing malady may summon discussion with the 
patient." 
Whenever nondisclosure or particular risk in-
formation is open to debate by reasonable-minded 
men-laymen, not physicians-the issue is for the 
finder of the fact, the jury. What in effect the court 
has said is that the question of whether or not the 
patient should have been told about certain risks 
is going to be a jury issue in every case. No matter 
how many times the court may instruct the jury that 
they are not to view the case in retrospect, it is 
impossible for them not to do so. They cannot get 
out of their minds what has already happened. 
The second case came up even more recently 
than the first-in October 1972 in California. In 
this particular instance, the surgery was for the 
treatment of a duodenal ulcer, a very small duodenal 
ulcer that had been very difficult to diagnose, even 
by x-ray. The surgeon explained that there were 
certain risks in the general anesthesia. He explained 
the nature of the operation, but none of the inherent 
risks, one of which is that in a certain percentage 
of the cases-I think about 5%-there may be some 
injury to the spleen or its adjoining structures. The 
patient did have injury to the spleen because one of 
the arteries broke loose, and he almost bled to death 
internally. Neither did the physician explain that 
the evolution of a new ulcer might occur; he got 
one of those. The patient had several other com-
plications and he sued the doctors and the hospital. 
This court came to the same general principle as the 
court in the District of Columbia, holding that, as to 
the duty to disclose available choices of therapy and 
dangers inherently and potentially involved, the phy-
sician must comply. The right of self-decision by the 
patient is the measure of the defendant's duty to 
reveal. 
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Now, both of these cases recognize two general 
exceptions which you should keep in mind. One is 
in the case of an emergency or where the patient is 
incapable of making a decision because of mental 
incompetency or infancy. If the treatment is immedi-
ately necessary, you can proceed without any type 
of consent. If the patient is incapable of making any 
type of decision because of infancy, the P,arents can 
certainly be fully advised and the consent obtained 
from them, if there is no emergency situation. The 
second refers again to the majority rule and there 
the court says that where the welfare of the patient 
dictates that he should not be told, there is reason 
not to tell him, but the burden of proving this is on 
the physician, not on the patient. In other words, 
this is an excuse or a reason for nondisclosure. The 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove he was not told, 
and if he was not, it is up to you to justify not having 
told him. The court pointed out that the fact that 
the patient may decide not to have therapy is not 
reason for not telling him. 
One court pointed out that nondisclosure is 
justified only where the reaction to the risk informa-
tion, as reasonably seen by the physician, is men-
acing, almost Hfe threatening to the patient. That is 
almost the only instance in which you would be 
justified in not telling the patient. In this regard, I 
should warn you that you must have expert testi-
mony to back up your decision. In the case in the 
District of Columbia, the surgeon testified that it was 
not in the best interest of the patient to tell him 
that he might be paralyzed from this laminectomy. 
The court paid no attention to that statement what-
soever, saying that it was for the jury to decide, since 
the physician was the only one who said this, and 
he had not given any background or any medical 
reason why it would have been harmful to the 
patient. There was no reason to believe that he was 
emotionally unstable or anything of that kind. I 
realize full well the restraints this places upon the 
medical profession, but I do not think we can ignore 
the fact that to some extent a person does have a 
right to determine what is going to happen to him. 
Both of these cases attempted to set forth 
certain types of things that a patient should or 
should not be told and little can be derived from 
reviewing these, because they do not make that 
much sense. One of the cases, for instance, referred 
to minor procedures and complicated procedures, 
and what you do in one case and what you do in 
the other. Of course, you can imagine what's going 
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to happen when someone says, "Well, it wasn't 
minor, afterall; it was complicated." 
There is another type of situation you en-
counter in "informed consent" cases. A patient was 
to have an arteriogram performed. There was no 
emergency; it was not necessary at the time that it 
be done; it was an optional procedure. The surgeon 
did not tell him that there was a risk of paralysis 
inherent, and he became paralyzed. The plaintiff 
recovered-that is, a verdict against the doctor. 
In another case, a patient of oriental descent 
developed hypopigmentation-I believe it was dur-
ing pregnancy. She consulted a dermatologist, who 
recommended dermabrasion, but he did not tell her 
that it was only 50% effective and that the condition 
might even be worse after he finished. It was worse, 
and she sued him. There was no question in that 
case. The court said that he had failed to conform 
to the duty imposed upon him to advise the patient 
fully of the successful nature of the operation if per-
formed, and also of its chances of failure. 
The courts have said, in effect, that if there is 
a serious risk of death or danger of death, even if the 
percentage is very small-down to 1 % in one of the 
cases-the physician must so advise the patient. 
Also, he should explain any alternative methods of 
treatment. Frequently, this is omitted. I pave found 
this to be true in any number of cases in which I 
have been involved. The physician has not told the 
patient that there were other methods of treating the 
condition, and he has left the patient with the im-
pression that the one recommended by him was the 
only one. What it boils down to is this: If the pa-
tient doesn't want to take the chance, on what basis 
can the medical profession justify forcing him to do 
so? If you can answer that question, then you have 
solved the problem, because then you can omit 
anything you want to. 
Some simple "do's" and "don't's": You must or 
should disclose the general procedure and generally 
what you expect to do, and what the patient should 
expect from the procedure. Also, you should identify 
the surgeon who is going to perform the surgery, 
and whether or not others will assist, particularly 
residents. In several of the teaching institutions, I 
have found that they do not tell a patient ahead of 
time that the surgery may be performed by resi-
dents. The risk of serious harm or death, where 
applicable, should be disclosed. This would be true 
in any major case, or certainly where any general 
anesthetic will be used. The peculiar risks of the 
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procedure involved should be explained to the pa-
tient. There's a greater duty to disclose if the pro-
cedure is experimental, new or novel, ultrahazardous, 
if there is a possibility of altering the sexual capacity 
or fertility of the patient, if it is purely for cosmetic 
purposes or if it is an optional procedure. 
The "don't's" that you might add to this in-
clude: Do not say that any procedure is simple, 
under any circumstances. Do not ever tell a patient 
that no complication can occur. Do not just answer 
the patient's questions and expect that to fulfill your 
obligation to fully inform the patient. Do not ex-
pect others to make a disclosure for you, such as 
the anesthesiologist who may come to see the patient, 
or any of the house staff. Do not minimize any part 
of the procedure or make a guarantee of any kind or 
any statement that resembles a guarantee or an assur-
ance that you or the procedure will cure the patient. 
There is one exception, of course, and that is 
if the patient specifically does not want to be in-
formed, you do not have to do so. Some people 
may not want to be informed of what can happen to 
them. If they do not want to, you should not burden 
them with it, but you should certainly document the 
circumstances very amply and very completely in the 
chart. 
I point out these two cases because they are 
a sharp departure from what has been the rule. How 
many states will proceed to follow this I have no idea. 
But a word of caution is always in order: If you ade-
quately protect yourself in this regard, you are cer-
tainly on the safe side. As I understand it, it is always 
better to overtreat than to undertreat. 
With respect to infants, I would mention that 
the consent should come from the parents; also, that 
now in most of the states 18, not 21, is the age of 
majority. Suppose an eighteen- or nineteen-year-old 
college student comes into your office needing treat-
ment. He has no means of support, and you are con-
cerned about who is going to pay your bill. You get 
in touch with the parents and ask them by long-
distance telephone if they will take care of the 
bill. They tell you that they will. Suppose a long 
series of treatment is undertaken, and the bill mounts 
into the thousands of dollars. The parents do not 
want to pay the bill, and they do not have to. At 
least in Virginia, and in most other states, the 
promise to pay the debt of another has to be in 
writing to be enforceable. This is the so-called 
statute of frauds. All you have to do is get the par-
ents to write you a letter and tell you that they are 
RUSSELL: UROLOGIST AND THE LAW 
responsible for the care and treatment of their child. 
Another thing to keep in mind is the value of 
a good set of records. One of the primary problems 
that I have run into is the inadequacy of some of the 
records kept by some of your colleagues, but I am 
sure none of you would neglect these. It is customary 
not to write down negative findings, but it is very easy 
to write down "otherwise negative" after you have 
made an examination. At least give some notation 
there, since the chart has to be your only means of 
remembering several years later that you did make 
other examinations. If there is a particular area of 
the patient's body that was being treated or was in-
jured at one time and has cleared up, a notation of 
this should be made in the chart to back up the 
fact that you did an examination. 
I spent eight days recently in a case where one 
of the main contentions was that a neurological 
examination had not been performed upon a patient 
from the day he was admitted to the hospital to the 
day he was discharged. The physician said that he 
had, but there was nothing in the chart to prove it. 
We were able to get out of it all right, but it was a 
difficult proposition. It is easy to correct. Any time 
the patient refuses treatment, this fact should be put 
into the chart. If you have a discussion with the 
patient with regard to the type of treatment, the 
alternatives, the risks, and so forth, this should also 
be put in the chart. 
It is my recommendation that, if you are going 
to perform planned surgery on a patient, you should 
take his consent in your office before the patient 
goes into the hospital. Then he cannot complain 
that he was under sedation, or that he was upset, or 
any number of other things that might influence his 
making a wise and full decision. 
A chart should contain, at each instance, the 
complaints of the patient, the history, the type of 
examination made, the treatment, the medication, if 
any, and any instructions which you gave the 
patient. Also, if the patient fails to keep an appoint-
ment, you should have your office staff thoroughly 
instructed to document this on the chart and then in 
the appointment book, and do not throw the ap-
pointment books away. There have been several in-
stances where this information was deemed crucial, 
and we were able to go back into the records and 
prove that a patient had failed to keep an appoint-
ment, after the patient had testified that he was never 
told to come back. 
I need not emphasize that any treatment which 
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may in any way affect the sexual ability of the 
patient is particularly sensitive, apparently for every-
one and should be well documented. This should be 
thoroughly explained to the patient; even the remote 
possibilities should be thoroughly explained. If there 
is any question about it, it would not hurt to obtain 
written consent. There have been several cases re-
cently where physicians who have performed vasec-
tomies have been sued because the operations were 
not effective. There have been cases where people 
have been allowed a recovery of damages for the 
cost of rearing a perfectly normal child who was 
unwanted, after the husband or the wife had sup-
posedly been sterilized. This is becoming a very 
sensitive situation, and it is a place where many of 
your colleagues have gotten into trouble. In one 
case which I read, no tests were run after the 
vasectomy was performed to determine whether 
there were any sperm. Others have given assurances 
to the patients that if they let the physicans perform 
the operation they would not have any more chil-
dren. That is what I mean by not giving any guaran-
tees. Do not say anything that can be construed as a 
guarantee. Be sure that the consent form you use spells 
this out clearly and simply, that there is no assurance 
that the operation will be effective, and . that there 
is no guarantee of any kind. 
With respect to the treatment of infants, I 
should say that the courts will intervene on behalf 
of an infant in a case where treatment is necessary 
or where the lack of treatment will be detrimental 
to the infant. Cases in point are where courts have 
ordered transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses. In one 
case, the court ordered a T / A because the child 
needed it and the parents objected. 
There are two cases in particular which I have 
seen recently where the court approved kidney trans-
plants. One was where the donor was about 27 years 
old and mentally incompetent. He had the only 
really good matching kidney, and the court gave its 
approval for the use of the kidney from the incompe-
tent to help his brother. They had psychiatrists who 
came in and testified that this would be of benefit 
to the incompetent because he was emotionally and 
psychologically dependent upon the well-being of his 
brother. Another case was that of twins about nine 
years old. The court said there again, based upon 
medical testimony, that it would be detrimental to 
the surviving infant if he knew that he could pos-
sibly have saved the life of his twin but was not given 
the opportunity to do so. 
253 
There is one last area of which we should be 
aware. That is alienation of affection by doctors on 
patients or spouses of patients. The significant thing 
is not only the conduct of the physician but the lia-
bility of his partners in his conduct. In one case, 
involving the pediatrician of a group practice the 
husband went to the senior partner, who was the 
managing partner, and complained about the pedia-
trician's conduct toward his wife. The managing 
partner did not do anything about it. He did not 
even discuss it with his partner, and after it was 
over, the court said it was up to the jury to decide 
whether this amounted to consent to the conduct of 
his partner. If it did, then the partnership, as well 
as the man who was involved personally, could be 
held ·liable, and this was true even though it did not 
involve partnership time. 
There was a recent case where a patient and her 
husband recovered from a physician-I understand 
it was a psychiatrist- $30,000 in compensatory 
damages and $120,000 in punitive damages for 
alienation of affection. I do not know how long this 
had been going on, but it went on long enough for 
the jury to decide to punish someone. You should be 
aware of the fact that malpractice insurance does not 
cover punitive damages. Even if there is coverage 
for compensatory damages-and it is questionable 
whether there is, in that kind of case-there cer-
tainly would not be for the punitive damages. You 
would have to pay that out of your own pocket. 
In this regard, never examine any female patient 
without your nurse being present. It has almost 
reached the point where you should not even talk to 
her without your nurse being present. 
Some of the matters I have referred to may 
seem unusual or unlikely and thus may not be long 
remembered. Let me reiterate, however, the impor-
tance of two items in particular. If nothing else re-
mains long in your minds, do not forget that com-
plete and adequate records are essential, both in the 
hospital and in the office. Nothing else will take their 
place when they are needed. Finally, keep in mind 
always the significance of informed consent. It is a 
rapidly changing principle and one which touches 
literally every field of medicine. It may be difficult 
to accept in all its aspects. You may not, probably 
do not, agree with much of it, but it is here to stay. 
It is an established legal concept, and it is far better 
to recognize it as such and learn to live with it rather 
than be caught by it. Good luck! 
